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Abstract:  
This paper analyzes data for a random sample drawn from the Dutch population who 
reveal their capacity to provide and sustain social capital by their propensity to invest 
and reward investments by means of an economic experiment. We have three main 
results. First, we find that heterogeneity in behavior is characterized by several 
asymmetries — men, the young and elderly, and low educated individuals invest 
relatively less, but reward significantly more investments. Second, higher expected 
levels of investments have a positive and significant effect on the level of investments 
themselves, corroborating the presence of social norms. Third, we compare our 
results with a laboratory experiment conducted with a student sample. We find that 
the student sample provides a lower bound of the population level of social capital. 
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1 Introduction
Most social relations are governed by implicit informal agreements rather than ex-
plicit contracts. Even in the later case, contracts are often incomplete, which gives
rise to strong incentives to act against the interests of other parties. Institutional
economists (e.g., North, 1990; Williamson, 1985) have argued that differences in the
costs to enforce contracts translate into cross-country differences in the performance
of organizations and economic growth.
Trust, trustworthiness, the propensity to rewarding others who trust (positive
reciprocity), and self-enforcing norms of behavior allow trades between two agents
to be completed and enforced informally, with lower transactions costs than re-
quired by complex contracts. It is now well accepted that social capital rests on these
primitives of economic agents (e.g., Bowles and Gintis, 2002). An important body of
empirical evidence supports an important link between social capital and economic
performance. Using trust as a proxy for social capital, Zak and Knack (2001) for ex-
ample find that countries with high measured trust have higher economic growth,
while La Porta, de Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that the cross-country
variation in levels of trust explains a sizeable portion of the cross-country variation
in organizational performance.
These cross-country variations in social capital have been estimated using sam-
ples of countries whose social and economic compositions differ greatly, suggesting
an important link between the level of social capital in a given society and the eco-
nomic and social composition of its population. At a micro level, this suggests that
the heterogeneity of supply of social capital across individuals within a society may
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well be related to individual differences in socio-economic characteristics and social
norms of behavior.
The empirical question we address in this paper is to measure how variations in
social norms, economic and social characteristics of individuals affect their propen-
sities to provide and sustain social capital. In order to perform our measurements,
we combine the strengths of survey and experimental methods by having a large
representative sample of the Dutch population play a computerized version of the
two player game similar to that presented by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995)
(henceforth BDMc). The structure of the game allows concerns for social efficiency
and motives of trust, trustworthiness, positive reciprocity, and altruism to emerge
from the players’ decisions. In this game, two players are given an equal endow-
ment, with one player randomly assigned to the role of a sender, and the other
player assigned to the role of a responder. The sender must decide how much to
invest from his endowment. This amount is doubled and transferred to the respon-
der, who must choose how much of his total wealth, i.e., the amount received plus
his endowment, should be returned to the sender. It is easy to see that investments
are socially desirable in this game as they increase the overall social surplus. An
element of trust is involved as senders bear a risk that responders return nothing.
Trustworthiness and reciprocity are involved as responders have the possibility to
reward trust placed by senders. Moreover, senders and responders may also invest
or return, regardless of the action of the other player, out of pure altruism (see e.g.,
Cox, 2004).
In concentrating on these aspects of social capital, we do not mean to suggest that
other dimensions — such as individual levels of involvement in communities, or
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individual efforts to build and maintain social ties — are unimportant in the larger
scheme of social capital.1 Rather, they are not objects of our enquiry.
Nevertheless, relating social preferences to socio-economic characteristics can
shed insights on the provision of social capital across communities. In most in-
stances, individuals are not randomly assigned to the communities they live in but
instead self-select themselves into their communities, presumably based to some
extent on their socio-economic characteristics. It is not necessarily the case that the
community which has the highest propensity to make social capital oriented in-
vestments also has the highest incentives to do so. To see this, let us consider two
communities which differ in terms of the background characteristics of their mem-
bers. It may be that the characteristics of the individuals in the first community are
such that they have a higher willingness to invest than the individuals in the sec-
ond community, but that the individuals in the second community have a higher
propensity to reward investments, and hence provide better incentives to invest. In
such a case, the asymmetric response is a direct consequence of the fact that indi-
viduals who have a relatively higher propensity to invest do not necessarily have a
higher propensity to reward investments.
The existence of such asymmetries may seem puzzling as it is commonly be-
lieved that the decisions of both parties in the investment game capture amongst
others motives of trust, trustworthiness, and altruism. This suggests that individ-
1See Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote (2002) for empirical evidence on the correlates of community
involvement. Carpenter, Daniere, and Takahashi (2004) present evidence from a field experiment in
Asia suggesting that trust and trustworthiness are significantly correlated with community involve-
ment.
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uals making significantly higher investments should be expected to be those rela-
tively more likely to reward investments. However, evidence in support of asym-
metries has recently been found in the lab. Chaudhuri and Gangadharan (2002) and
Buchan, Croson, and Solnick (2003) for example find that men invest relatively more
than women, while women reward investments significantly more then men. There
are a priori no reasons to believe that asymmetries could not exist with respect to
age, education levels, or income.
Investigation of all the issues mentioned above requires having samples of par-
ticipants with more heterogeneous socio-economic backgrounds than commonly
found in the lab. The combination of a representative sample and an experiment
offers a unique opportunity to explore in detail these issues.
A potential alternative to perform our measurements is to draw a representa-
tive sample of respondents from a population, and present each of them with one
or several questions capturing specific aspects of social capital. Allesina and La
Ferrara (2002), for example, investigate how answers to the World Value Survey
(hereafter WVS) trust question correlates with observable characteristics.2 While
this approach has the benefit of being easily implemented both within and across
countries, the use of hypothetical questions has been criticized on the basis that re-
spondents’ answers do not correlate well with their observed behavior. Glaeser,
Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) and Ga¨chter, Herrmann, and Tho¨ni (2004)
for example find that answers to this and related survey questions do not correlate
with investments made in a public good experiment. In this paper, we will look
at whether or not differences in investment behavior across individuals of different
2See section 2 for the exact phrasing of this question.
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gender, age, or any other socio-economic characteristic are robust to using a survey
rather than an experimental proxy for social capital.
The paper makes three additional contributions. First, we contrast the behavior
of our heterogeneous sample to that of a student sample by repeating our experi-
ment in the laboratory. This allows to investigate whether laboratory experiments
with student subjects are informative about the level of social capital in the popu-
lation as a whole. Whether or not the lab provides information on the population
level of social capital is a valuable insight as experiments are more easily conducted
in the lab with student samples rather than with representative samples. Comparing
the behavior of our representative and laboratory samples can be more generally re-
lated to the literature interested in assessing the external validity of lab experiments.
The later has generally been tested by comparing the play in the laboratory with the
play by more heterogeneous samples, namely newspaper readers (e.g., see Bosch–
Dome`nech, Montalvo, Nagel, and Satorra, 2002), and specialized samples including
professional traders (Haigh and List, 2005) and CEO’s (Fehr and List, forthcoming).
These studies typically find that the behavior of subjects in the special sample differs
from the behavior in the student population. However, they either do not attempt
to relate these differences to observable characteristics of subjects or report very few
significant correlations (see, e.g., List, 2004; Ga¨chter, Herrmann, and Tho¨ni, 2004).
Instead of focusing on a limited number of subgroups of a population, representa-
tive samples provide more of the necessary variation in observable characteristics
to precisely measure the effect of a change in characteristics on economic behavior.
Three noteworthy experiments have recently been run with representative samples.
Harrison, Lau, and Williams (2002) use a random sample of the Danish popula-
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tion to investigate the heterogeneity in individual discount rates. Hey (2002) uses
the CentERpanel of Tilburg University (more on this panel later on) to draw a ran-
dom sample of subjects from the Dutch population who make decisions under risk
and uncertainty. Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003) present
results from an experiment with a random sample of the German population.
Second, the theoretical literature on social norms suggests an important associa-
tion between own decisions and the subjective expected behavior of others who face
similar decisions (see Elster, 1989; Ostrom, 2000). There are, to our knowledge, no
empirical studies looking at the relationship between variations in individual sub-
jective social norms and variations in individual investments in social capital in an
experimental context. In our game, social norms cannot be inferred from the choice
data without imposing a priori strong assumptions on how these norms are formed.
One such set of assumptions consists of equating someone’s subjective expectation
about the behavior of other players in the same role, with the observed sample av-
erage of investments. This is similar but not identical to the practice of inferring
peer effects in the social interactions literature from the observed behavior in a ref-
erence group (see e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001). This approach implicitly assumes
that individuals who have the same reference group have identical expectations. We
take an alternative route, suggested in Manski (1999), of eliciting directly a person’s
subjective expectations about the average behavior of other individuals in the same
role. This approach allows for a greater heterogeneity in expectations as expecta-
tions are no longer tied to reference groups. Eliciting subjective expectations raises
endogeneity issues, as participants’ stated expectations may be correlated with their
experimental decisions. We conduct exogeneity tests to investigate this possibility.
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Finally, our approach has the additional advantage over lab experiments of al-
lowing to test for possible bias caused by using subjects selecting themselves in the
experiment based on observable or unobservable characteristics which can be cor-
related with the decisions in the game, a topic on which very little is known. Eckel
and Grossman (2000) report evidence suggesting the presence of participation bias
in a classroom experiment. Their approach however compares responses of student
volunteers to that of pseudo-volunteers who still partly self-select themselves in the
experiment. Here, we test for participation bias using non-participants who truly
self-select themselves out of the experiment.
Our results can be summarized as follows. First, we find substantial heterogene-
ity in investment and returns on investment behavior in the Dutch population. The
heterogeneity we uncover is characterized by several unexpected asymmetries. In
particular, women are found to invest significantly more than men, but reward in-
vestments significantly less; low educated individuals invest significantly less but
reward investments significantly more than higher educated individuals; the rela-
tion between age and investment is inverted U-shape, with a maximum level of in-
vestment at 37 years of age, while the relation between reward behavior and age is
convex and in many cases even U-shaped, reaching a minimum at the age between
35 and 38 years. Second, we find that behavior of participants in our laboratory
sample provides a lower bound on the level of social capital in the population. In
particular, amounts invested and returned were substantially lower in the student
sample than in the heterogeneous sample. These differences are found to disap-
pear when controlling for the composition effect of both samples, suggesting that
economic and social characteristics of participants are sufficient to explain the ag-
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gregate differences across both samples. Thirdly, social norms, i.e., higher prior sub-
jective expectations about the investment levels of other senders, have a significant
and positive effect on investment decisions. Fourth, inferences using the WVS sur-
vey question are significantly different from those using our experimental measure.
Finally, we cannot find evidence of participation bias in any experimental decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the de-
sign of the experiment, the experimental procedure, and our sample. Section 3
presents our experimental results. Section 4 contrasts differences between invest-
ment and reward patterns across groups of the population. Section 5 summarizes
our results and concludes.
2 Experiment and Samples
Survey Experiment
The recruitment of our representative sample of participants was made by CentER-
data, the survey research institute of Tilburg University in the Netherlands. The
main activity of CentERdata is to manage and carry out panel surveys through a
telepanel: the CentERpanel, consisting of approximately 2000 representative Dutch
households. Every Friday, household members of the CentERpanel receive a ques-
tionnaire which they are asked to fill in at any time between Friday and Tuesday of
the following week. This questionnaire is filled at home either on a computer or on
a television set which is connected to a set–up box linking the household to the Cen-
tERdata server. In order to keep the sample representative, low income households
without a computer or a television set are given the necessary equipment in order
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to complete the weekly questionnaire.3
There are many reasons why the CentERpanel is an attractive medium to con-
duct experiments. First of all, it gives us access to a representative sample of a popu-
lation. Second, because participants answer questions on a computer or a television
set, we are able to replicate as closely as possible the environment of a laboratory ex-
periment, making results more comparable to those of the existing literature. Third,
because we communicate with participants via CentERdata, the experiment is dou-
ble blind as participants were told that they will be anonymously matched and that
their identities would not be revealed to the experimenters. Finally, as CentERdata
reimburses the weekly telephone costs for answering the questionnaire by credit-
ing CentERpoints (1 CentERpoint = 0.01 Euro, hereafter CP) to their private bank
accounts four times a year, our participants are already familiar to payment in fic-
titious currency. This allows us to use CP as the experimental currency unit and
reimburse our participants in a very convenient way.
Our design closely follows the investment game proposed by BDMc. Some prac-
tical aspects of using the BDMc design are that it has been found to be robust to sev-
eral framing effects (Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing, 2000). In our game, a sender
and a responder were both endowed with 500 CP.4 The sender could send money
3For a description of the recruitment, sampling methods, and past usages of the CentERpanel see:
http://www.centerdata.nl . Children below 16 years of age as well as immigrants are excluded from
the panel. The latter group for the reason that their language proficiency in Dutch makes it difficult
for them to answer the questions on a weekly basis.
4For ease of reading we keep the terms “sender” and “responder” for the different roles. In the
experiment we omitted suggestive labels and referred to the person itself or to its opponent as “the
matched panel member.” Computer screens of the original experiment (in Dutch) are available upon
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to the responder from his endowment. We discretized the choice set of the sender
to 11 investment possibilities I ∈ {0, 50, ..., 450, 500}. The amount sent was doubled
by the experimenters and added to the endowment of the responder.
Responders made their choices using the strategy method, by which they were
asked to state how much they would return to senders for all 11 possible amounts
they could receive. For each amount invested, the maximal amount responders
could return was their endowment of 500 CP plus two times the amount invested.
The amounts returned were not constrained to be discrete. The element of the vector
of responses which corresponded to the actual investment of the sender was chosen
to be the effective action and determined the payoff of both participants. The strat-
egy method, dating back to Selten (1967) was chosen to overcome the difficulty of
having members of the CentERpanel interact in real time. This method has several
additional advantages. First, it facilitates data acquisition as the complete strategy
plan for all 11 possible amounts received is elicited. Second, as our game may seem
complex to some subjects, the strategy method requires that people thoroughly fa-
miliarize themselves with the ramifications of all choices, so that we do not retrieve
data from uninformed subjects.5
After all participants made their decisions, senders and responders were ran-
domly matched and payoffs were computed based on the decisions of the pair. The
request. The translated text of all screens is enclosed in appendix A.
5There is weak evidence suggesting that a hot environment triggers stronger responses in two
player games. McLeish and Oxoby (2004) find that the play of proposers and responders in the
ultimatum game does not significantly differ between a hot environment and an environment where
responses were collected using the strategy method. Similar results are reported by Brandts and
Charness (2000) for sequential two player games.
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final payoffs were computed as follows: a sender received the initial 500 CP reduced
by the amount invested plus the amount received from the responder, while the re-
sponder received her initial endowment of 500 CP, the amount sent by the sender
multiplied by 2 less the amount returned to the sender.6
We elicit beliefs of players in our experiment with a series of questions, all of
which were asked after players made their decisions in order to circumvent the pos-
sibility that belief elicitation induces non–cooperative behavior when asked before
the play of the game.7 We measure social norms for senders by asking them for
their prior subjective expectations of the average amount which will be sent in the
experiment. Because responders had to make 11 different decisions, asking for their
prior social norms of behavior would have meant asking them to answer 11 sub-
jective expectation questions, one for each of their decisions. Given CentERpanel
has an agreement with its survey participants that no more than thirty minutes of
their time would be required to answer questions every week, it was not possible
for us to elicit prior social norms for responders. Responders were only asked to
state how much they thought of receiving from senders. The rationale behind ask-
6The multiplier represents efficiency gains of the social interaction. Multipliers vary across stud-
ies. BDMc for instance use a multiplier of three, whereas Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter
(2000) apply a multiplier of two.
7Subjects were not rewarded based on the accuracy of their expectations. There are theoretical
grounds suggesting that, assuming subjects are risk neutral and do not distort probabilities, beliefs
elicited using the quadratic scoring rule should be more accurate than unpaid elicited beliefs. The
empirical evidence seems not very supportive of this. Ortmann, Fitzgerald, and Boeing (2000) find
that unpaid senders in their trust game had surprisingly accurate estimates of the average amounts
sent by other senders while both Friedman and Massaro (1998) and Sonnemans and Offerman (2001)
find insignificant differences between elicited beliefs of paid and unpaid subjects.
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ing responders for those beliefs was to investigate whether decisions recorded using
the strategy method are consistent with decisions associated with outcomes respon-
ders believed would materialize during the play of the game. This concluded the
experimental part of the session.
All players were then asked to answer a question about their past experiences
with trust
Lifetime trust experience question In the past, when you trusted someone, was
your trust usually rewarded or usually exploited?
(Always exploited) 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 (Always rewarded).
This question will be used to test for the presence of state dependent behavior
whereby differences in past experiences with trust may lead to different investment
behavior.
Two weeks after the experiment, each participant received feedback information
on the outcome of the game and their final payoff which was later credited to their
CentER bank accounts. The experiment was conducted in two sessions, in the 31st
and the 36th weeks of the calendar year 2002. Individuals contacted had to read an
opening screen informing them that they were selected to participate in an experi-
ment conducted jointly by a team of university researchers. A detailed description
of the game followed with the mode of payments. Each person was informed that
conditional on their participation, they would be randomly assigned to one of the
roles and matched to another panel member. The role was revealed once a panel
member had agreed to participate. We contacted 541 panel members from which 42
declined to participate. Of the 499 panel members who completed the experiment,
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276 were senders and 223 were responders.8
Laboratory Experiment
The laboratory experiment differed from the survey experiment in the following
ways. First, participants were recruited at the campus of Tilburg University, either
by email using a list of past participants, distribution of flyers, or advertisement
in the campus newspaper. Participants were primarily undergraduates who were
mainly studying economics and business administration. Second, we have no infor-
mation about prospective participants who heard about the laboratory experiment
but decided not to participate, a clear disadvantage compared to our survey exper-
iment. Third, the experiment took place at the experimental laboratory of Tilburg
University, located on the campus of the university.
In total, 10 sessions were conducted in November and December of 2002. Strong
emphasis was placed on keeping participants’ identities private information. Upon
arrival, participants received a show up fee of 2 Euros and an identification (ID)
code which they used as identifier for the experiment. In exchange of their ID-code,
each participant collected a sealed envelope containing feedback information and
his payoff (in Euros) two weeks after the experiment. This mirrors the delay of
payment used with the representative sample. Participants were asked about their
demographics and income in a post experimental questionnaire. This questionnaire
was a copy of the one used by CentERdata to collect information from its panel
8Note, that the number of senders exceeds the number of responders. In order to balance the un-
equal number of players in both roles, 53 responders were randomly assigned twice to a sender. Ex-
actly like all other participants, those responders received payments resulting from only one match-
ing, namely the first.
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members. Using the same questionnaire ensured that the information gathered in
the lab was perfectly compatible with the information gathered by CentERdata.
In total 100 students participated in the experiment, of which 52 were senders
and 48 responders.9 None of the persons which registered for the laboratory exper-
iment declined to participate later.
Table 1 gives the explanation of the variables and descriptive statistics of the
players in the representative and laboratory samples, sorted by their role in the
game. The means of most variables are relatively identical across all groups, re-
gardless of the sample. Two notable differences in the representative sample are the
work propensity and age. Non–participants are on average 10 years older than both
senders and responders. This age effect is also reflected in a higher labor market
retirement frequency and lower work participation.
As we expected, the composition of both samples is very different. We comment
here on the more important differences. We find a relatively higher representation of
men in the lab sample.10 Participants are significantly younger and have lower per-
sonal income in the laboratory sample relative to the representative sample. Most
participants in the survey sample either have a secondary or training degree as their
highest level of education.11 This is in contrast to the education levels of laboratory
9The matching procedure used to deal with the imbalance between the number of senders and
responders in the survey experiment was also used in the laboratory experiment.
10The gender ratio in the lab mirrors the one of students who are subscribed to business admin-
istration and economics. Nol Lebbink, head of the student administration department from Tilburg
University supplied us with the information about the ratio of women in those fields of study, which
is 0.4.
11CentERdata distinguishes between 9 different education degrees. After consulting CentERdata,
we merged those to the following 4 categories: low education (no education (yet), primary edu-
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participants who all have a secondary degree which serves as a prerequisite to un-
dergoing university studies. Only a few laboratory participants have had already
completed a university or training degree at the time of the experiment. Almost
none of them is working compared to more than half of panel members who do.
Catholics and protestants are the two most important religious communities in
the representative sample while having no religious affiliation (being atheist) is
the modal response in the laboratory sample.12 The superior number of reported
catholics in the laboratory sample is partly a consequence of the fact that Tilburg
University is located in a predominately catholic area in the south of the country.
It is interesting to note that the variances in age and income are significantly
smaller in the lab sample, accompanied by practically no variation in levels educa-
tion, making it difficult to measure age, income and education effects using only the
laboratory data.
Participation Decision
Because we observe the characteristics of individuals in our representative sample
who decide not to participate in the experiment, we are able to test for the pres-
ence of participation bias. Participation bias could be present if, for example, par-
ticipants have unobservable predispositions to gamble or systematically different
levels of risk aversion. We estimated all our models with an auxiliary participation
equation, allowing the unobservable random components of the equations of inter-
cation, special education, other), secondary education (lower secondary education and higher sec-
ondary education), training degree (intermediate vocational training and higher vocational training),
university degree (university education).
12Atheists are the predominant group subsumed in the variable OTHERS in both samples.
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est to be correlated with the unobservable random component of the participation
equation, in a manner reminiscent of Heckman (1978). In this setup, unobserved
characteristics common to both the experimental decisions and the participation de-
cision would be picked up by the correlations between the unobservable compo-
nents of the equations of interest and the participation equation.13 We found that
none of the correlations were statistically significant, indicating the absence of bias
driven by individual predispositions towards play in games.14 One explanation for
the lack of bias may be that the individuals who participate in the CentERpanel
are already drawn from a pre-selected sample of individuals motivated to answer
questions. Individuals in this sample may thus differ less in terms of unobservable
predispositions to participate. This pre-selection problem is however not specific to
our approach, but is shared with most non-experimental survey data sets, as well as
laboratory experiments where participants are recruited from a mailing pool of past
participants.
3 Experimental Results
The sample distributions of investments is shown in Figure 1. The distribution of
investments in the representative sample is skewed to the left, with more than 30%
13As exclusion restriction, we use the proportion of questionnaires completed by panel members
in the three months which preceded our experiment. This variable affects participation but does not
directly affect the experimental measure used in this paper and captures therefore directly the partic-
ipation propensity of subjects when participation is uncorrelated with financial outcomes (members
of the CentERpanel are not paid to participate in the panel).
14Estimation results are available upon request to the authors.
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of the sample investing half of their endowment (i.e., 250 CP). In contrast, the dis-
tribution of investments made in the student sample has a mode at 0 CP, with more
than 25% of the sample investing nothing, while less than 10% of the sample invest
half of their endowment. A Pearson chi square test (p-value = 0.000) easily rejects
the null that both distributions are the same.
We measure the propensity to reward investments using the return ratio, defined
as the amount returned divided by the maximal amount which can be returned,
given an amount invested. For a given investment, the maximal amount which can
be returned equals the amount invested multiplied by two, plus the experimental
endowment of 500 CP. Because we use the strategy method, we observe a sequence
{Ra ∈ [0, 1] |a ∈ {0, 50, ..., 500}} for each responder, where Ra denotes the return ra-
tio when receiving an investment of a CP. The main advantage of the return ratio
is that it is automatically scaled, which controls for the fact that receivers can send
more simply because the total available amount increases with a.
We summarize the implications of responders’ behavior in Figure 2, where the
left and right columns present graphs for the representative and student samples,
respectively. The top panels present two return ratio curves. The curve with solid
squares represents the sample median return ratio for all 223 responders of the rep-
resentative sample, and all 48 responders in the student sample for all possible levels
of investment. The important feature of these two panels is that the ratios monoton-
ically increase and are concave in the amounts invested.
Existing results on the investment game do not report such a monotonic response
behavior (e.g., BDMc; Cox, 2004). One possible explanation for this discrepancy is
that the monotonicity we observe is a consequence of using the strategy method,
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which induces responders to sequentially return increasingly higher proportions as
the amounts they can possibly receive increases. Without data on responders behav-
ior gathered in an environment of immediate interaction, this possibility cannot be
tested. However, some insights can be obtained by comparing the sample median
return ratios using the full strategy vector data with the median return ratios using
only the element of the strategy vector associated with the investment a respon-
der believed would materialize in the play of the game. Because we are keeping
only one element of the strategy vector for each responder, increases in return ratios
across two consecutive levels of investment cannot be the result of having the same
individuals reporting monotonically increasing return ratios. Results are graphed in
the top panels as a curve with solid triangles.15 We find that the shape of both curves
are similar across all possible levels of investments in both samples, indicating that
responders’ decisions tend to increase monotonically with the amounts invested.
Does it pay to invest? In order to answer this question graphically, all graphs in
the bottom two panels of Figure 2 plot a common set of visual aids. The lower and
upper dashed lines of all four graphs plot the return ratios providing investors with
a return on investment (ROI) of respectively ROI = 0 (investors received exactly
what they invested) and ROI = 1 (additionally to the amount sent, investors receive
the entire surplus created by sending) for all possible levels of investment I. The
dotted line plots the return ratios providing proposers and responders with equal
monetary payoffs.16
15Outcomes associated with amounts sent of 400 and 450 CP were believed to occur by only 3 and
0 responders respectively, and were not added to the graph.
16These ratios are solved as follows. By definition, the ROII for a level of investment I corresponds
to ROII = (AI − I)/I, where AI denotes the amount returned at that level of investment. The return
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The middle panel reports the sample median return ratios for the representative
and student samples. The median return ratio for the representative sample follows
closely the RI(ROII = 0) line for the representative sample, but is below this line
for investments in excess of 100 CP for the laboratory sample. This indicates that
senders have an estimated 50% probability of making a loss when playing against a
random responder from the Dutch population, as opposed to a significantly higher
probability when interacting with a responder from the laboratory.17
In order to quantify differences in the spread or the return ratio distribution for
both samples, we plot the 25th and 75th percentiles of both distributions in the lower
panels of Figure 2. We find that the return ratio distribution is more dispersed in the
student sample than in the representative sample. In particular, the 25th sample
percentile in the representative sample practically coincides with the sample me-
dian and with the RI(ROII = 0) line, indicating that approximately 25% of the
responders compensate investors exactly by returning to them their investment. On
the other hand, the 25th percentile in the student sample is both substantially lower
ratio RI is defined as AI/(2I + E), where 2I + E is the maximal amount which can be returned (i.e.,
twice the investment I plus the endowment E of 500 CP). Substituting AI by RI(2I + E) in the return
on investment formula and rearranging, we get RI(ROII) = I(ROII + 1)/(2I + E), representing the
return ratio which is consistent with a return on investment of ROII .
In Figure 2 the dashed lines represent RI(ROII = 1) and RI(ROII = 0) for all possible levels of
investments I; and the dotted line plots a return ratio consistent with equal monetary payoffs, which
for the game at hand is characterized by responders returning three quarters of the amount they
receive, i.e., AI = 3/4 · 2I.
17Comparing the median return ratios of the representative sample to those of the student sample
using a Mann-Whitney-U test results in p-values (for the null hypothesis that medians are the same)
which are below 0.001 for for all investment levels.
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than the sample median, and well below the RI(ROII = 0) line, suggesting again
that the probability that senders make losses is greater in the student than in the
representative sample.
Several broad patterns emerge from the descriptive analysis of investment and
reward behaviors. First, there are considerable investments made in the Dutch pop-
ulation. Second, returns on investments cannot be increased by investing more,
a feature which holds for both the representative and laboratory samples. Third,
amounts invested and amounts returned are significantly lower in the laboratory
sample than in the representative sample.
3.1 Empirical Results on Investment Behavior
In this section, we investigate the determinants of investments I, an ordinal and
discrete variable. Define I∗ as a proposer’s unobservable latent propensity to invest.
The mapping between I∗ and I is given by:
I∗i = x
′
iβ + εi (1)
Ii = k if mk−1 < I∗i ≤ mk, k = 0, . . . , K (2)
The index i denotes the individual, xi is a vector of explanatory variables including
a constant term, β is the vector of parameters of interest, and εi is the error term,
assumed to be normally distributed N(0, 1). The index k represents the category of
the discrete amount sent and K the total number of categories. We make the usual
normalization m−1 = −∞, m0 = 0, and mK = ∞. The thresholds m1, . . . , mK−1
can be seen as nuisance parameters. As can be seen from Figure 1, there were little
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investments from 300 to 450 CP, which prevents identification of all threshold pa-
rameters. In our empirical application, we merge these categories and estimate by
Maximum Likelihood a model with eight outcomes (K = 7).
The first two specifications of Table 2 present parameter estimates of the model
combining the data of the representative and laboratory samples. The condition-
ing vector x in the first specification contains a constant term and a dummy variable
LAB equal to 1 for observations in the laboratory student sample and 0 otherwise. In
line with the previous descriptive results, amounts invested are significantly lower
in the student sample. The second specification adds controls for observable char-
acteristics of participants, previous life experiences when trusting others (TRUST-
EXP), and the subjective beliefs about the expected investment made by other play-
ers (SNORMS).18 The difference between the student and the representative samples
captured by the LAB variable is no longer significant once we control for differences
in observable characteristics, suggesting that differences in the background char-
acteristics of players explain the better part of the difference in behavior in both
samples.
Both the linear and quadratic terms in age are significant, indicating an inverted-
U relation between age and investments in social capital, with the propensity to
invest reaching its maximum at 37 years of age.19 This reconfirms the inverted-
U shape pattern usually found in the social capital literature (e.g., Putnam, 2000;
Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) and is also consistent with age profiles estimated using
18We have experimented with a specification including cross–terms but none was found to be
statistically significant.
19Because we are using a cross-section, the age effect could also be a cohort effect, the two cannot
be distinguished here.
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measures of community involvement (Glaeser, Laibson, and Sacerdote, 2002).
Women (FEMALE) invest significantly more than men, a finding which departs
from laboratory experiments using the investment game. Those studies find that
men either invest relatively more than women (e.g., Chaudhuri and Gangadharan,
2002; Buchan, Croson, and Solnick, 2003), or no significant differences in amounts
invested between both sexes (Croson and Buchan, 1999). When restricting ourselves
to the laboratory sample only (not reported in the table), average investments of
women still exceed those of men, but the difference is no longer significant (p-value
= 0.555).
Economic status, reflected through employment status and personal income,
does not have a significant effect on investment decisions. We do not find any effects
of retirement status (RETIRED) on investment decisions, conditional on age. This
observation is in contrast to Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner
(2003) who do not find any effects.
Our results indicate that individuals with secondary, technical training, and uni-
versity degrees are more likely to make higher investments than subjects with low
education levels (the omitted category). These results differ to Alesina and La Fer-
rara (2002), where education effects seem to have a linear impact, and Fehr, Fis-
chbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003) who find no effects.
Subjects were classified as either protestants, catholics, or atheists. We find no
evidence that either catholics or protestants invest differently than atheists or indi-
viduals of other religions (the omitted category). These results are concordant to the
Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) study, but in contrast to the Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosen-
bladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003) study who find a positive effect for catholics.
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Interestingly, past experiences when trusting others (TRUSTEXP) do not have
a significant effect on social capital investments. This result does not support the
prediction of the indirect evolutionary approach to adaptation through experience
literature (for a recent survey see Ostrom, 2000) which suggest that someone’s social
investment behavior is directly related to his past experiences. Some experiments
have looked at how past experimental decisions and outcomes in multiple period
investment games influence current period decisions (e.g., Engle-Warnick, 2004).
The type of past experiences we measure here is complementary, as it covers lifetime
experiences with trust rather than their experiences in the more recent experimental
periods.
Individuals with higher expectations about the level of investments made by
other senders (SNORMS) invest significantly more than senders with lower expec-
tations, which corroborates the presence of social norms geared at increasing effi-
ciency and social cooperation.
Endogeneity of our social norms variable is a potential concern if participants
conditioned their subjective expectation statements on their investment decisions.
Such conditioning could result for example from subjects stating expectations in an
attempt to rationalize their investment decisions. We test our model specification
using the statistic proposed by Butler and Chatterjee (1997). Under the null hypoth-
esis of normality of the error term εi and exogeneity of the model regressors xi, the
Butler and Chatterjee test is distributed chi square, with degrees of freedom being
a function of the number of outcomes of the categorical variable I, the dimension
of the vector x, and the number of model parameters.20 Test values and associated
20In particular, let {dki}K−1k=1 be a sequence of binary variables, with element dki taking a value of
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p-values are reported at the bottom of Table 2. We find that the null hypothesis is
not rejected at conventional levels, suggesting a correct model specification.
In order to check whether pooling both samples influences our estimates, we re-
estimated the second specification omitting the student sample. Results of this exer-
cise are presented in the third column of Table 2. We find that results are relatively
insensitive to the inclusion of the student lab sample, with all parameter estimates
keeping their sign and degree of significance, an indication that the relatively small
sample size and the relatively small variation in observable characteristics of the lab
sample do not contribute greatly to identify the model parameters.
Inferences using WVS trust question as a proxy
Measuring social capital using experiments is difficult when the target group is a
nation’s population. A more accessible alternative consists of surveying a popula-
tion and asking direct questions on intended behavior. The WVS trust question has
been used by a number of researchers to proxy for social capital (e.g., Alesina and
La Ferrara, 2002). We focus here on whether the effect of background characteristics
found above can also be obtained by using answers to the WVS trust question.
In order to compare our experimental results to those obtained using survey
questions, the CentERpanel asked a large sample of panel members who did not
1 when Ii = k and 0 otherwise. Denote by mi the (K− 1)× 1 vector of stacked moments where the
jth element is given by ∑Ni=1
(
xi(dji − Pr (Ii = j|xi))
)
. The Butler and Chatterjee (1997) test statistic is
based on the quadratic form N ·m′i(V−1i )mi with Vi = mim′i, evaluated at the parameter estimates
of the ordered probit model. Under the null hypothesis that εi is normally distributed and that the
vector xi is exogenous, this statistic is distributed chi square with [dim(xi)− 1] · (K − 2) degrees of
freedom.
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participate in the experiment to answer the following question
WVS trust question Generally speaking would you say that most people can be
trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
Given the strong link between our experiment and the WVS question, it was
crucial that these panel members did not play the experiment. This overcomes the
problems of having had the experiment either before or after the survey question
influence either responses. We collected answers to this question from 2191 panel
members in October 2002. Descriptive statistics of this new sample (the column
”WVS survey participants” of Table 1) indicate that the composition of this new
sample is relatively identical to that of the experimental sample used above.
We follow the popular trend (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) of grouping in a sin-
gle category individuals reporting not knowing whether they trust with individuals
who do not report trusting others. Based on this aggregate measure, 50.5% of re-
spondents stated not trusting others. The last two columns of Table 2 report the
results from a probit regression of answers to this survey question on background
characteristics of the panel members. The differences with the experimental esti-
mates are quite remarkable. First, we do not find any effect of education on survey
trust, while low educated individuals invest relatively less in the experiment. A
second noticeable difference with the experimental measure is gender, with women
more likely to state that they trust others. Women were found to make significantly
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lower investments than men in the experiment. Other notable differences are that
positive past experiences with trust and higher gross personal income now have
positive and significant effects on the probability of stating to trust others, while
no such effects were found in the experiment. Finally, the inverted-U shape effect
of age is still present using survey trust, while economic status variables such as
income and work do not correlate with stated trust.
3.2 Empirical Results on Rewards to Investment
The individual level analysis of the return ratio Rai is based on the following Tobit
model
R∗ai = γ0 + γ1a + γ2a
2 + z′iη+ (a · zi)′α1 + (a2 · zi)′α2 + ei (3)
Rai = R∗ai if R
∗
ai > 0 (4)
= 0 if R∗ai ≤ 0 (5)
where equation (3) describes an individual’s latent propensity to reward invest-
ments, and equations (4) and (5) describe the censoring rule which allows respon-
ders with extremely low propensities to return nothing with positive probability.
Like for the case of investments, the return propensity is modelled as a function of
the amount invested by the sender, i.e., a ∈ {0, 50, . . . , 500}, background character-
istics zi, the vector of unobservable parameters η, and an unobservable component
ei ∼ N(0, σ2). The quadratic form in a is added to capture the monotone increasing
shape of proportions returned.21 We interact the quadratic form of a with the ob-
21We have estimated a less restrictive specification with dummy variables for each a category.
Results were numerically identical to those presented above.
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servable characteristics to allow return ratio vectors to differ across individuals both
in terms of levels and slopes.
We estimated two specifications grouping both the representative and the lab
samples. The first included only the dummy variable LAB for decisions made in the
laboratory and its interaction with the quadratic form in a. The second specification
added controls for background characteristics, with all variables interacted with the
quadratic form in a. In light of the relatively high number of parameters, and that
most variables did not have a significant effect on the slope of the return ratio vectors
(their corresponding elements of α1 and α2 were not statistically different from zero),
Table 3 reports the regression results keeping only the interaction terms which were
significant.
Results from the first specification confirm the descriptive analysis of the previ-
ous section, namely that the average return ratio vector is increasing and concave in
a, and that return ratios are significantly lower in the student sample compared to
the representative sample. The insignificance of both interaction terms of the LAB
variable with the quadratic form in a suggest that differences in average return ratios
between both samples are relatively constant over all possible levels of investments.
Like for the case of investments, we find that the magnitude of the LAB variable
diminishes and is no longer significant once we add controls for background char-
acteristics, suggesting that differences in observable characteristics explain most of
the discrepancies between both samples. A log–likelihood ratio test (χ229=349.34, p-
value= 0.000) clearly prefers the model with controls for observable heterogeneity
in the population.
Several variables have a significant impact on the level of the return ratio vector
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but not on its slope. We find that women return relatively more than men, and low
educated individuals (the omitted category) return relatively more than higher ed-
ucated persons, most of these differences being either significant or close to being
significant at the 5% level. These patterns are contradictory to those of investment
behavior, where all these variables had a significant but opposite effect on invest-
ment decisions. We discuss this issue in more detail in the following section.
The impact of responders’ beliefs about the investment they thought they would
receive (RTHINK) only enters significantly (at the 10% level) when crossed linearly
with a, which means that the positive effect on the return ratio of expecting higher
investments increases with the amount invested.
Age is the only variable with both a significant effect on the level and the slope
of the expected return ratio vector. Due to the number of parameters involved, it is
difficult to fully grasp the age patterns by looking only at the parameter estimates,
most of which are significantly different from zero and of different signs. We instead
comment on their effects by plotting the predicted expected return ratio conditional
on age for regularly spaced investments of 0 CP, 100 CP, 200 CP, 300 CP, 400 CP, and
500 CP.22 We fix the level of the expected return ratio vector by setting all charac-
teristics of the return propensity equation (3), except age, at their sample average.23
Figure 3 presents the predicted age profiles. There are two striking aspects to this
graph. First, there is strong U-shape relation between the propensity to reward and
age for investments between 0 and 200 CP, with the expected return ratios reaching
22We make use of the fact that the conditional expectation of Ra, censored at zero, is equal to
E(Ra|z, a) = (E(R∗a |z, a) + σ · λ(z, a)) · Pr(R∗a ≥ 0|z, a), where λ(z, a) denotes the inverse Mills ratio.
23What we set these variables at matters mostly for the level of the simulations, and not the slopes
of the age profiles.
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a minimum in the range of 35 and 40 years of age, close to the turning point of the
inverted U relation between investments and age discussed in the previous section.
The U-shape pattern flattens out progressively as levels of investment increase but
remains convex over the age domain.
As in the case of the investment decision, measures of economic status such as
whether an individual works or personal gross income do not correlate significantly
with the return decision. Religion and past experiences with trust also do not have
significant effects on the response behavior. Finally, the last two columns of Table
3 reports estimates of the second specification using only the representative sample
data. Again, we find very little differences in either sign of significance of parameter
estimates.
4 Discussion of asymmetries
The previous section has provided evidence that the heterogeneity in investment
and reward behavior is significantly related to observable characteristics of partici-
pants. This relation was found to be characterized by some surprising asymmetries.
In particular, keeping other factors constant, men and low educated individuals
make significantly lower investments, but reward investments significantly more.
This pattern was also found to hold for the young and the old, at least for invest-
ments representing less than half of the senders’ endowment.
Because the present paper is one of the first systematic exploration linking back-
ground characteristics of a random sample of a population with their experimental
behavior, it is difficult to relate the age and education asymmetries to other exist-
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ing results. By far the easiest and most documented asymmetry we can relate to is
that of gender. Croson and Buchan (1999) note that gender differences in the invest-
ment game tend to be conditional on the level of risk present in the experiment. In
decisions where risk is present, such as the investment decision in our game, they
find that the behavior of women and men does not systematically differ. On the
other hand, for decisions involving no risk, such as responders in our game, women
return significantly more. Our results do not support this explanation, as we find
that women invest more than men despite the riskiness of the situation, while men
return significantly more than women in the risk free role of responders, suggesting
that gender effects are unlikely to be universal.
Another explanation could be that subgroups of the population react differently
in the roles of senders and responders because the benefits and costs of sending
money to the other party, possibly out of pure altruism, differ between senders and
responders. In our game, senders need only to forego 50 CP to transfer 100 CP to
the other party, as investments were multiplied by two, while responders had to
tradeoff one to one to transfer back to investors. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001)
for example find that men are more altruist when the costs of altruism is low, while
women are more altruist when the cost of being altruist is high. Quite to the con-
trary, our gender effects indicate that women send significantly more than men
when cost of altruism are relatively low (in the investment decision), but men send
relatively more when the cost of altruism are relatively high (in the responders de-
cision).24
24Our game differs from dictator games used by Andreoni and Vesterlund to measure altruism
because trust and trustworthiness are also intrinsic and perhaps the most prevalent motive for in-
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Some support for this hypothesis can be obtained by comparing our results to
those of Fehr, Fischbacher, Rosenbladt, Schupp, and Wagner (2003). In their design,
both amounts invested and amounts returned were doubled, thus in effect equaliz-
ing the costs of sending money to the other party across both roles.25 Their regres-
sion results do not support the presence of significant asymmetries in investment
and reward to investment behavior across the German population.26 These and our
results suggest that asymmetry in the incentive structure of the game may be an
important aspect in explaining asymmetries in investment and reward behavior.
5 Conclusion
Societies are composed of heterogeneous individuals who differ in terms of their
socio-economic characteristics and, possibly in terms of their propensities to trust,
reciprocate, or to be altruist. Because societies change and because of the well docu-
mented link between social capital and economic efficiency, recovering the link be-
tween the heterogeneity in observable characteristics and heterogeneity in propen-
sities of individuals to enhance and sustain social capital becomes increasingly im-
vesting and rewarding investments in our experiment.
25Our design differs from theirs in several other ways. First, their experiment is performed after
face-to-face interviews conducted for the German Socio-Economic Panel. Second, they use an envi-
ronment of immediate response rather than the strategy method to collect the reward decisions of
responders.
26They find that individuals 65 years and older invest relatively less but reward investments rel-
atively more than individuals below 35 years of age, while immigrants invest relatively more but
reward investments relatively less than natives. Both asymmetries are, however, only significant at
the 10% level.
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portant. This study presented results from a computerized experiment combining
the strengths of experiments and survey data collection methods which allowed us
to collect data on investment and reward behavior for a random sample of individ-
uals drawn from the Dutch population. The different inferences we obtained using
answers to a survey question on trust, which is widely used as a proxy for social
capital, indicates the importance of combining experimental and survey methods in
order to allow heterogeneous participants to reveal rather than state their propensi-
ties to provide and sustain social capital.
The first important set of results was that the heterogeneity in propensities to in-
vest and to reward investments in the Dutch population can be linked to several im-
portant socio-economic characteristics such as age, education, and gender. Equally
important, this heterogeneity in behavior was shown to be characterized by pre-
viously undocumented asymmetries. In particular, holding other factors constant,
men, low educated individuals, and the young and the old were respectively found
to make significantly lower investments, but reward significantly more. These re-
sults have important implications as they suggest that communities, because of the
homogeneous socio-economic composition of their habitants, may have a relatively
higher propensity to invest and a relatively lower propensity to reward these invest-
ments, and hence provide relatively lower incentives to invest than other commu-
nities. In terms of education for example, our results suggest that keeping other
factors constant, the propensity to invest is higher in groups of high educated indi-
viduals than in groups of low educated individuals, but the propensities to reward
investments are higher in the group of low educated individuals than in the group
of high educated individuals. Because the experiment presented here was static and
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involved interaction between strangers, we are unable to make inferences on the dy-
namic evolution of the possible tensions between the willingness to invest and the
incentives to do so if individuals interact together for longer periods of time. Nev-
ertheless, we think our results suggest the need for such investigations.
A second important result is that social norms seem to have played an important
role in determining investment behavior in our experiment, with senders investing
more the more they thought other senders would. Also, whether subjects had good
or bad past lifetime experiences when trusting others has no significant impact on
their investment and reward behavior in our experiment.
A third result is that the behavior observed in our laboratory sample differed
significantly from that in our representative sample, with lab participants making
significantly lower investments, and rewarding significantly less than participants
in the representative sample. We showed that differences in the observable compo-
sition of both samples account for most of the observable differences in behavior.
Despite these differences, the laboratory sample was nevertheless informative of
the behavior in the Dutch population in the sense of providing a lower bound on
the levels of investments and on the propensities to reward investments. Similar
lower bounds were found by Ga¨chter, Herrmann, and Tho¨ni (2004) for public good
games, which indicates that such results may also hold for different populations and
social dilemma games. This finding indicates that trust, trustworthiness and other
social preferences, once identified in the lab, are likely to be present, and in more im-
portant forms in the population as a whole. These results are encouraging as they
suggest that laboratory experiments may serve as an important first step to identify
population levels of existing and new forms of economic primitives and preferences
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of individuals.
A Instructions (Translation)
The first 3 screens of the experiment are the same for both senders and responders.
Italic notes in the translation are comments by the authors.
• First screen:
This experiment is a research project of researchers from Humboldt University
Berlin and Catholic University of Brabant.27
With this experiment you can make real money in terms of CentERpoints.
You receive from the researchers additional CentERpoints (besides the usual
telephone allowance).
• Second screen:
During this experiment you will be matched with another member of the
panel. You will not know who this person is, both of you will stay anony-
mous. Both of you receive 500 CentERpoints. Then the experiments starts.
One of you has the possibility to send a share of this away. The amount of
points sent will be doubled and given to the other person. The other person
has then the opportunity to send a share of the own total amount back. The
amount which is sent back will not be doubled.
How many points you finally earn depends therefore on your decision and the
decision of the person you are matched with. You will be randomly assigned
to your role.
• Third screen:
We now give you the chance to indicate whether you want to participate. If
you decide not to participate, the experiment will end immediately. You will
receive the usual telephone reimbursement. If you continue you will receive
the 500 CentERpoints.
27Now: Tilburg University. The Catholic University of Brabant changed its name after the experi-
ment.
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Do you want to continue?
© Yes
© No
Subjects who choose to participate were then randomly assigned to their roles. Senders
and receivers had to read decision screens tailored to their roles.
Senders
• Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this per-
son received 500 CentERpoints. You can send a share of your 500 CentER-
points. The panel member with whom you are matched with receives the
amount you sent multiplied by 2. Then, this person has the opportunity to
send a share of the own total amount back (without knowing who you are).
The amount which this person sends back to you will not be doubled.
How many points do you want to give?
(The sender could send one out of 11 possible amounts.)
© 0 the other person receives additionally nothing and has therefore 500 and
you remain with 500 points.
...
© 500 the other person receives additionally 1000 and has therefore 1500 in
total and you remain with 0 points.
• Fifth screen:
(was depending on the decision taken at the fourth screen, here as example “200”)
You decided to send 200 CentERpoints.
The panel member you are matched with receives therefore 400 additional
CentERpoints.
He or she has therefore in total 900 CentERpoints.
You remain with 300 CentERpoints.
How many points do you think the other panel member with whom you are
matched with will send to you?
(Participants had to type in a number. In this example in the range of [0,900].)
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• Sixth screen:
This experiment is done with some panel members. Half of them interact in
the same position as you. They can send a share of their 500 CentERpoints
which is doubled and received by a person of the other position.
How many points do you think those panel members have sent?
(The sender could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500).
Responders
• Fourth screen:
You have been matched with another member of the panel. Like you, this per-
son received 500 CentERpoints. This person is asked to send you a share from
their own 500 CentERpoints. You will receive the amount of those points the
other person has sent multiplied by 2.
For example, if the other person sends 100 CentERpoints, you will receive 200
CentERpoints. Together with the 500 points you begin with, you will have in
total 700 CentERpoints.
From this amount you can return a share. The amount you send will not be
doubled.
• Fifth screen:
As we do not know now how many CentERpoints the other panel member
with whom you are matched with has sent we present all possible amounts
this person could send to you. The amount you receive is written in the next
column. Please indicate in the last column what amount you would return for
each possible amount sent.
After the real decision of the other person is known the amount you indicated
for this particular decision will be realized. The amount you will return will
be deducted from your total amount.
(The responder had to indicate for each of 11 possible amounts the sender could send
what he would return. The table was designed as follows:)
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If the other sends: I receive: In total with the In this case I return:
500 CentERpoints:
0 0 500
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
500 1000 1500
• Sixth screen:
How many points do you expect the panel member with whom you are matched
with has sent to you?
(The responder could indicate one out of 11 possible amounts from 0 to 500.)
After these screens the experiment was over. Nobody could go return to a previous screen
from the experiment. Senders and responders were asked the following post–experimental
questions:
• Seventh screen (Trust experience question):
The last two questions are about trust in general. This question is about your
own trust experience.
If you trust is your trust generally rewarded or exploited?
Choose the number which is closest to your answer.
always rewarded 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 always exploited.
(Participants had to type in a number between 1 and 7. For the data analysis we
inverted the order, that higher numbers are associated with more positive experience,
i.e. we recoded 1 by 7 and so on: always exploited 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 always rewarded.)
• Eight screen (WVS trust question):
Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
cannot be too careful in dealing with people?
1.) Most people can be trusted.
2.) You have to be very careful.
3.) I do not know.
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Return ratio
Coef. t-value Coef. t-value Coef. t-value
CONSTANT -0.063 -4.607 0.257 3.128 0.247 2.833
a 0.088 17.759 0.011 0.477 0.008 0.320
a2 -0.005 -11.844 -0.001 -0.597 -0.001 -0.582
LAB -0.096 -3.258 -0.068 -1.547 - -
LAB×a 0.001 0.101 -0.007 -0.449 - -
LAB×a2 -0.0002 -0.275 0.0002 0.191 - -
FEMALE -0.044 -1.947 -0.051 -1.861
AGE -0.013 -4.718 -0.011 -4.207
AGE2/1000 0.161 5.374 0.146 4.829
RETIRED -0.013 -0.775 -0.006 -0.376
SECONDEG -0.104 -1.980 -0.098 -1.891
TRAINDEG -0.081 -1.823 -0.072 -1.789
UNIVDEG -0.141 -2.456 -0.136 -2.201
WORK 0.017 2.129 0.011 1.356
LNINC 0.002 1.479 0.002 1.615
CATHOLIC -0.002 -0.456 -0.009 -1.224
PROTEST 0.002 0.231 0.003 0.478
TRUSTEXP -0.011 -1.033 -0.014 -1.157
BTHINK 0.003 0.728 0.003 0.662
AGE×a 0.002 5.633 0.003 6.295
AGE2/1000× a -0.028 -5.472 -0.032 -6.116
AGE×a2 -9.37E-5 -9.783 -0.0001 -11.217
AGE2/1000× a2 0.001 4.719 0.001 5.329
σ2 0.021 23.334 0.021 22.11
Student sample included Yes Yes No
Number of observations 2981 2981 2453
Log-Likelihood 862.13 1036.80 939.83
Table 3: Responder results – Tobit estimator. The t-statistics are based on robust
standard errors. Only the significant interactions of variables with a and a2 are re-
ported in the second and third specifications. Other interaction terms were included
in the regressions but are omitted from the table.
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Figure 1: Distribution of amounts invested in the representative and students sam-
ples.
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Figure 2: Top row presents the median return ratio in the representative and the
student samples for each possible amount received using the full strategy vector
response data (square line). Circle line presents the median return ratio using only
the element of the strategy vector corresponding to the amount responders believed
they would be offered. Middle and bottom rows plot visual aids to understand
response behavior in the representative and student samples. The lower (upper)
dashed lines represent the return ratio providing senders with a return on invest-
ment ((Amount returned - Amount sent)/Amount sent) of 0 (1). The dotted lines
represent the return ratio providing senders and responders with equal monetary
payoffs. The middle row plots the median return ratio for both samples. The lower
row plots the 25th and 75th quantiles of the return ratio for both samples. NF de-
notes the sample size used to compute the return ratio for each outcome based on
the full strategy vector, NB denotes the sample size used to compute the return ratio
for each outcome based on their expectations. The sum of NB across all categories
gives the sample size in both samples. In the later case, cells with less than 5 data
points are not plotted.
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Figure 3: Predicted expected return ratio’s by age and levels of investments re-
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acteristics (except age).
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